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THE RULE OF LAW
AND THE EXEMPTION STRATEGY
Kent Greenawalt*

INTRODUCTION

Do exemptions from ordinary legal requirements for religious
individuals and groups contravene the rule of law? If they do only
sometimes, rather than always or never, under what circumstances do
they do so? This Article explores these intriguing questions, raised
powerfully by Marci Hamilton's important and challenging book God
vs. the Gavel. I
I offer some general observations about the concept of the rule of
law, sketch problems posed by religious exemptions, survey various
accepted features of our legal order that may seem similarly in tension
with the rule of law, and consider in detail the significance of certain
kinds of religious exemptions and whether it matters if they are created
by legislators or judges.
These inquiries lead me to less stark conclusions than Professor
Hamilton suggests and indeed to urge a reformulation of the basic
question. That is better understood as: To what degree do various kinds
of religious exemptions sacrifice particular standards and values that the
complex idea of the rule of law embraces? Although I draw from
Professor Hamilton, my aim is not to determine exactly what she thinks,
but to use her ideas as a starting point for an independent account.

I.

THE COMPLEX CONCEPT OF THE RULE OF LAW

In order to decide whether any practice in our legal system violates
the rule of law, we need a sense of what the requirements of the rule of
law are. That is not so simple. One reason is that the concept, as our
legal culture has come to understand it, includes disparate elements.
Some elements are undoubtedly part of the concept; the status of others

• University Professor, Columbia University, teaching at Columbia Law School.
I MARCI A. HAMILTON, Goo vs. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LA w (2005).
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is arguable. A more fundamental source of disagreement is whether the
concept is mainly about techniques of law making and law application
(an instrumental approach) or is mainly about values such as liberty (a
substantive approach). 2 Some authors have proposed radical shifts in
how we should understand the rule of law,3 and Jeremy Waldron has
urged that the rule of law is an essentially contested concept, which at
its core produces competing interpretations that are not subject to
resolution.4
Adhering to what I take to be a standard modem understanding of
the rule of law, I comment briefly on some elements that undoubtedly
make up part of that understanding and other elements that one might or
might not include.
A.

Applying the Law as It Is Written

A core element (some might say the core) of the rule of law is that
officials apply the law rather than resolving disputes arbitrarily on the
basis of personal interest or inclination. The familiar phrase: "A rule of
law, not of men," suggests this notion. Of course, officials can apply
the law only if there is a law deriving from a legitimate authority
external to the decision maker5 to apply. A regime in which all disputes
were taken before a ruler who dispensed justice according to his sense
of the moment would not satisfy the rule of law. A society can enjoy
the rule of law only if it has law and officials apply that law. One might
well add other features of what Lou Fuller called the internal morality
of law: rules must be general, not directed to specific cases; they must
mainly operate prospectively; they must be relatively clear, accessible,
and stable; and they must be of a kind that allows people to conform to
them. 6
Insofar as a legal system realizes this core element, it avoids
partiality in the application of law. The law, as written, is evenly
applied to the people it covers. However, this element alone provides
no safeguard against gross injustice in the law that is actually written
and enforced. A legal system that treats some human beings as chattel

2 Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule ofLaw, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 783 (1989).
3 Among the best known of these proposals is Margaret Radin's suggestion that if we
conceive rules, from the standpoint of Ludwig Wittgenstein's theory, as based on agreement, we
can adopt a sense of the rule oflaw that is pragmatic rather than formal and that distinguishes real
law from the law on the books. Id.
4 Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?, 21
LAW & PHIL. 137 (2002). Waldron takes as his starting point different claims about the rule of
law made by partisans of the 2000 election dispute between George W. Bush and Albert Gore.
5 See RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LA w IN AMERICA 4, 12-19 (200 l ).
6 LON FULLER, THE INTERNAL MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (rev. ed. 1969).
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property could achieve this minimal version of the rule of law. And
were we to focus exclusively on this feature, we might conclude that the
legalistic, racist regime of the former Union of South Africa did fairly
well to satisfy the rule oflaw.7
B.

Standards ofLaw that Yield Relatively Clear Applications

When we think of a rule of law, we are likely to imagine legal
standards that are clear in their content and whose application to
particular circumstances is (at least for the most part) definite. 8 This
aspect of a rule of law is a corollary of the first element. If the
standards set by law are themselves very hard to grasp or so vague that
their application to many circumstances is arguable, different officials
will make different judgments about how to apply the standards. Evenhanded application will be impossible, and inevitably officials will end
up relying on their personal inclinations in choosing among competing
possibilities for interpretation and application. By contrast, the rule of
law yields what Ronald Cass has called "principled predictability.''9
In this regard, we may think of the rule of law as contrasting with
official discretion. It contrasts most straightforwardly with the kind of
discretion officials possess when the law explicitly leaves them broad
latitude to decide within a range, as when a public utilities commission
sets "a fair rate." No one supposes that the law tells the commissioners
just what rate is fair; they are free to consider factors that do not reduce
to the application of law. The less the law guides the exercise of such
official discretion, the greater the tension with the rule oflaw.
This ideal of the rule of law also contrasts with the kind of
"discretion" judges have when the written law is so confused or so
indeterminate in its scope that its application requires complicated,
delicate judgments about which reasonable, well informed experts
disagree. 10 Judges and other officials cannot apply such laws evenly to
situations until the highest court in a jurisdiction settles authoritatively
what view will count as correct.
We may pause here to note that any ideal of a complete regime of
laws, all of which apply clearly to whatever circumstances arise, would
be impossible to achieve. More important for our purposes, there are
Fuller does note that some standards of racial identity were very hard to apply.
See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law ofRules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
9 CASS, supra note 5, at 4, 7-9.
IO Ronald Dworkin has distinguished between these two kinds of discretion. See Ronald M.
Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHJ. L. REV. 14 (1967); Ronald M. Dworkin, Judicial
Discretion, 60 J. PHIL. 624 (1963). I have questioned whether the distinction is as sharp as he has
suggested. Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters
That Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359 (1975).
7

8
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strong reasons not to achieve such a regime to the maximum degree that
is possible. 11 A legal system needs some flexibility. It is desirable,
sometimes, to give officials discretion to set rates they deem fair; it is
desirable, sometimes, to have legal standards that are relatively vague
and open to changing circumstances, and whose application to many
particular situations is arguable.
It follows that systems of law that we may identify as fulfilling the
rule of law will themselves not have the maximum possible degree of
definite, predictable, even application of clear precise legal rules. 12

C.

People Who Do the Same Things Are Treated in the Same Way

A rather different element of the rule of law is that the law should
treat similarly people who do the same thing. This ideal can be traced
much farther back, but it was explicitly included as part of the concept
of the rule of law in the nineteenth century by Dicey, who was
particularly concerned that the rulers and powerful not have one law for
themselves and another law for ordinary people. 13 According to this
ideal, no person or institution should be privileged. The law should
treat commoners and nobles, rich and poor, whites and blacks similarly.
As Jeremy Waldron has put it, "Our belief in the rule oflaw commits us
to the principle that the law should be the same for everyone: one law
for all and no exceptions."14
This element of the rule of law is closely tied to ideas of equality.
No system allowing slavery could come close to being governed by the
rule of law in this sense. But a legal system that did little to compensate
for differences in talent and fortune could be governed by the rule of
law and still allow striking social inequalities. 15
The ideal of treating people who do the same thing in the same
way raises subtle questions about what it is to do the same thing, which
will occupy us in subsequent sections of this Article.

11 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-34 (2d ed. 1994).
12 When officials do exercise various kinds of discretion, it is consonant with the rule of law
for their authority to make such judgments to be conferred by law.
13 ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
(Elibron Classics ed. 2005).
14 Jeremy Waldron, One Law for All? The Logic of Cultural Accommodation, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 3 (2002).
15 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974)(representing such an ideal).
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No Imposition ofNarrow Views, and (Possibly) Attention to the
Common Good

If according to the law, clergy who commit murder escape the
death penalty that is imposed on ordinary citizens (as was the practice at
one time in England), it is a patent violation of the rule of law
requirement that people be treated the same way if they do the same
thing. 16 But what if an Act of Conformity requires all citizens to attend
Anglican services? The law requires the same acts of everyone, but the
very actions it requires impose one point of view over others; and it
effectively privileges those who wish to worship as Anglicans in
relation to those who wish to worship in other ways or do not wish to
worship. It is easy to conceive that such a privileging of one particular
position violates the rule of law, especially since compelling
nonbelievers to worship as Anglicans impinges on them more than
would some disabilities that involve explicitly unequal treatment.
One might think, further, that whenever legislation is adopted that
does not reflect judgments about the common good but instead serves
narrow interests at odds with the common good, that legislation not only
constitutes a failure according to ideals of representative democracy, it
also violates the rule oflaw.'7
My own inclination would be not to incorporate into the concept of
the rule of law a general mandate to aim for the common good. Such an
approach would condemn much legislation as violating the rule of law,
and might lead us to lose sight of what is distinctive about that concept
in relation to other ideals of representative govemment. 18
16 HAMILTON, supra note l, at 243-48.
17 Hamilton stresses the need of legislators to consider the common good. I am not sure
whether she sees that as a requirement of the rule of law. However, she does suggest that
applications of the rule of law require a governing law enacted by legislatures "charged with
consideration of the public good." Id. at 274.
18 Cass gives a similar reason for not making conformity of law with sound morality an
element of the rule of law. CASS, supra note 5, at 15. My position leaves me wanting to declare
that some laws that privilege narrow positions, such as the Act of Conformity, do violate the rule
of law but that ordinary pandering to the interests of lobbyists does not. I am not sure how to try
to draw that line.
Much of Professor Hamilton's Response to my essay focuses on the two fundamental
questions of a desirable allocation of responsibilities between legislatures and courts in this area
and on whether exemptions for religious claimants have been too extensive. My views on those
questions can be found in KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, VOLUME I,
FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS (2006) [hereinafter GREENAWALT VOL. I], and KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, VOLUME II, ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS
(2008) [hereinafter GREENAWALT VOL. II]. Here I am addressing only the relation of those
fundamental questions to the rule of law. I understand Professor Hamilton's response about that
to be that if a body that is poorly suited for the task determines exemptions and if it consistently
makes serious mistakes about what differences in circumstances matter, that violates the rule of
law, especially if the body takes undue account of the common good. On that understanding, her
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Acceptance by Citizens

Perhaps a government can adhere to the rule of law in the face of
widespread nonobservance of law by its citizens, but for a society to
live by the rule of law, its citizens must broadly accept governance
according to the rules of law. Most obviously, citizens fail to adhere to
the rule of law if they do not comply with important legal rules and with
official decisions about their circumstances. 19
Another possible form of "nonacceptance" is more interesting. If
citizens or groups ply legislators or courts for privileges that do not
accord with the rule of law, they may be seeking unfair advantages.
Their failure to adhere to the rule of law consists in their attempting to
get law-making bodies (including courts) to adopt measures that are not
faithful to the rule of law. We could not reasonably indict someone on
this count unless we have initially concluded that what she seeks is at
odds with the rule of law in a way that is undesirable. To this extent,
claims about this kind of nonacceptance are parasitic on judgment about
what the rule of law requires.20

II.

RULE OF

LAW PROBLEMS FOR RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS

A religious exemption for our purposes is a privilege not to comply
with ordinary legal requirements based on a criterion that refers to
religious belief or practice. Thus, members of churches for whom
ingesting peyote is the central aspect of their worship services may be
given a privilege to use peyote despite a general ban on use of that
substance.
One might take the view that any singling out of a religious basis
for an exemption automatically departs from the rule of law. At least
one sentence in Professor Hamilton's book adopts this approach
(although I am doubtful that this reflects her full view). She writes that
she is arguing "that the right balance is achieved by subjecting entities
to the rule of law-unless they can prove that exempting them will

thesis about the rule oflaw ties very closely to her general factual claims.
19 A person faithful to the rule of Jaw will observe many legal requirements, such as tax
liabilities, without official intervention. Faithfulness does not preclude appeal of decisions of
lower officials and does not require observance of written rules, such as some speed limits, for
which literal compliance is not expected.
20 Were we to accuse someone of not accepting the rule of law, we should probably also need
to conclude that she recognizes that what she seeks is unfair in a way that rule of Jaw ideals would
condemn. (It would not be necessary that she recognize what the concept of the rule of Jaw
covers.)
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cause no harm to others."21 If one parses this sentence, part of its
meaning is that when religious entities deserve an exemption because it
will do no harm, and the legislature grants the exemption, the entities
are not being subjected to the rule of law.
Two clarifications are important here. If someone supposes that
any exemption for a religious entity departs from the rule of law, he
probably will think that other exemptions, formulated according to other
criteria, also depart from the rule of law. If a person adopts this view
about religious exemptions and also thinks, as Hamilton clearly does,
that some religious exemptions are warranted, 22 the crucial practical
question about a proposed exemption will not be whether it departs
from the rule of law but whether its departure is justified.
Hamilton's basic comparisons are between ordinary people subject
to the law and religious persons who may get an exemption. That is
also my main focus, but I should mention in passing another
conceivable objection that religious exemptions always violate the rule
of law. One might think that some class of persons is different enough
from the ordinary people to whom a law applies so that an exemption
for that class would not depart from the rule of law, but that that class is
never properly definable in terms of religion. The reason is that some
nonreligious people, say secular moral objectors, are not fairly
distinguishable from religious objectors. According to this viewwhich is neither Hamilton's 23 nor mine 24-the rule of law violation in a
religious exemption could consist of treating religious persons more
favorably than the nonreligious others who are equally deserving of the
exemption.
In what respects do religious exemptions offend or depart from the
rule of law? If they are clearly stated and applied according to their
terms, they do not compromise the element that the law should be
applied as it is written. The problems lie in the ideals of clear
application and equal treatment. (I am disregarding the possibility that
a failure to accord with the common good is itself a failure to accord
with the rule of law.)
The most obvious point is the one that may have led Hamilton to
suggest that an exemption automatically departs from the rule of law.
An exemption treats differently someone who is doing the same thing as
does (or would) a person who violates the law and does not enjoy the
exemption. Some person or group is privileged on the basis of a
religious status, activity, or belief. The rule of law is directed against
21 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 5.
Id. at 280-81. Hamilton writes, "When the harm to others is de minimis with the
exemption, religious believers should be granted the exemption." Id. at 280.
23 See id. at 11, 275, 280-81.
24 See generally GREENAWALT VOL. I, supra note 18; GREENAWALT VOL. II, supra note 18.
22
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such privileging. We need to explore this approach with more depth
and nuance, but this is its nutshell version.
Not all religious exemptions are troublesome in regard to
nondiscretionary judgment, but some of the most important are. A
statute that protects the use of peyote in worship services can, for the
most part, be applied straightforwardly and evenly. But what of a legal
rule that declares that if a law imposes a substantial burden on a
person's religious exercise, it cannot be applied against that person
unless it serves a compelling interest that cannot be accomplished by
less restrictive means. I have paraphrased the language of the Supreme
Court's basic free exercise test from 196325 to 1990,26 of two federal
statutes, 27 and of some state statutes and of standards construing state
constitutions. 28 This language is wide open and vague. Different
officials and different courts faced with similar situations will apply the
standard differently. 29 The language does not confer the kind of
discretion that our public utilities commission had, but it does leave
judges (and other officials) with delicate, controversial judgments about
how the standard applies, precluding even application of the law. If
judges are called in to make judgments for which they are not
competent, and if in fact the posture of individual cases-focused on the
plight of particular religious persons-leads judges to overvalue
individual interests at the expense of the common good, the situation is
even worse. Religious persons will often be privileged when they
should not be. According to Hamilton, our culture too often equates
religion with good, neglectful of the evil religions often do. For her, the
substantial burden / compelling interest standard already favors
religious claims unduly,3° the circumstances of judicial application
amplify the problem.3 1 Thus, the concerns about unclear standards play
into the concerns about unjustifiable privileging of religious persons.

See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). I am passing over whether the Court
ever meant what it said. My view is that in exemption cases, "compelling interest" was not, and
should not have been, taken as constraining the government to the degree that that test does in
equal protection and free speech cases.
27 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006); Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to -5 (2006).
28 See GREENAWALT VOL. I, supra note 18, at 202.
29 See id. at 201-32 (for a broad review of cases showing the differences in interpretation).
30 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 91-110 (on land use).
31 Id. at 97-99 (RLUIPA as encouraging litigation that benefits religious landowners).
25
26
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RULE OF LAW ELEMENTS AND THEIR ABSENCE: SOME COMMON
FEATURES OF OUR LEGAL SYSTEM

If we are fairly to appraise rule of law objections to religious
exemptions, we need to place them into the context of other features of
our legal system. That system is shot through with elements that do not
conform with a simple rule of law model. These require us to
acknowledge that the American legal system is a terrible failure in
respect to an ideal of a rule of law; to recognize that whether we should
aim to adhere to various aspects of a rule of law is often highly
doubtful; to develop a much more nuanced account what is crucial for
the rule of law; or perhaps to do some combination of these things.
Our very first, and core element of the rule of law was that the law
should be applied as written. Yet, police may decide whether to arrest
violators, and prosecutors have wide ranging discretion whether to
charge people with crimes they have committed. Prosecutors employ
this discretion to make individual judgments about culpability, to
conserve resources (by plea bargaining to avoid trials and by not
charging when they think they cannot win), and to assure crucial
testimony for other cases. These aspects of our criminal law are only
one way our system does not assure that people who perform similar
acts are treated similarly. When I began teaching law in 1965, the
dominant sentencing schemes were highly discretionary. The "just
deserts" approach that led to sentencing guidelines has seriously
reduced a judge's discretion, but judges still have some latitude to make
judgments about appropriate sentences that are not controlled by law.
And, of course, plea bargains, which judges typically accept, include
agreements over sentences that may vary greatly from the standard
sentence range for the crime that a defendant demonstrably committed.
Someone might object that not applying the law to a violator is not
nearly as bad as "applying the law" arbitrarily to someone who has
committed a violation. I concede that, but "the rule of law" is not
observed if those who demonstrably have committed serious crimes are
not prosecuted or receive much lighter sentences than others who have
committed the same crimes.
The written law itself contains many, many exemptions and
privileges. As I have mentioned, an exemption from an ordinary legal
requirement might be based on someone's status, activity, or belief.
When we think carefully about such exemptions, we recognize that the
line between a privilege and an exemption is thin or nonexistent and
that saying what constitutes "the same act" is frequently elusive.
Among various privileges or exemptions based on status, police officers
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can use force in circumstances in which ordinary citizens may not;3 2
doctors, lawyers, psychotherapists, and (by statute) journalists need not
disclose information acquired in confidence that an ordinary friend or
associate would have to disclose (no matter how private the
conversation and how absolute the friend's promise of secrecy). Public
officials, as well as former employers asked by prospective employers
to evaluate workers, are not liable for defamatory comments that would
be actionable if uttered by others. Although we commonly talk of a
police officer's privilege to use force, a lawyer's privilege not to testify,
a judge's privilege to defame, it's not hard to see that these privileges
are exemptions. The police officer is exempt from the ordinary
restrictions on the use of the force; the lawyer is exempt from the
ordinary rules about compulsory testimony. Each of these privileges or
exemptions is justified in terms of the common good, not because the
status of the privileged person, or his particular relationship with
someone else, intrinsically deserves protection.
Various privileges or exemptions parents enjoy with respect to
their children are less obviously grounded entirely in notions of public
good. In most states, a father violates no law if he gives his unruly child
a quick spanking in the supermarket. Others around the child, even the
child's teacher, are not allowed to use this <degree of physical force.
One might defend the parent's latitude as contributing to the common
good, but one might instead, or also, view the parent-child relationship
as somehow prepolitical or extrapolitical, a relationship with respect to
which state interference should be restrained because the boundaries of
political coercion should be limited. Putting the point differently, one
might offer a natural rights or separate spheres defense of some parental
privileges, rather than claiming that by some utilitarian calculus the
privilege serves the general welfare. In this respect, claims about
exemptions based on religion may come closer to parental privileges
than those of the police, doctors, and lawyers.
When we tum to consideration of what acts are the same acts, a
crucial issue about the rule of law and possible exemptions based on
activity or belief, we run into the broad extent to which states of mind
figure into how the law defines acts and imposes liability. A hunter
shoots and kills another hunter. If he intended to kill his victim, he has
committed murder. If he was pretty sure he was shooting at a deer but
perceived a slight chance his target was a human being, he has
committed reckless homicide, manslaughter (unless his recklessness
displayed a gross indifference to human life, in which case he has
committed murder).33 If he was certain he was shooting at a deer, he is
guilty only of negligent homicide, often a lower degree of
32
33

See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.07 (1985).
See MODEL PENAL CODE§§ 210.2b, 210.3 (1985) (murder and manslaughter respectively).
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manslaughter. Or, if he acted reasonably, he is innocent of any crime.
According to the law of most states, a person who kills another
lacks a self-defense justification, despite objective conditions that would
support the defense (her victim is then trying to kill her), if she is
unaware of the justifying conditions (or perhaps if they do not motivate
her action).3 4
If my arms push against a man in a subway, whether I have
committed a tortious battery depends on whether I have been thrown off
balance and involuntarily put out my arms, or I have pushed him
because I am fed up with his irritating comments. As far as the person
who is pushed is concerned, the physical impact could be exactly the
same.
Students of the criminal law sometimes distinguish intent from
motive, with motive referring to someone's ulterior purposes in
performing an act. The law, it may be said, takes account of intent, but
not motive. Thus, if one hunter intentionally kills another, he is a
murderer, whether his aim is greed, revenge, political conviction, or
charity (relieving his victim of a life the victim has said repeatedly he
wishes would end). I believe the distinction between intent and motive
is less than clear-cut, that a more precise classification is often in terms
of more or less immediate objectives,3 5 but certain crimes definitely
make motive relevant. Two persons perform exactly the same physical
act, publicizing information about the locations of American forces; one
is guilty of treason because he aims to assist an enemy in wartime, the
other is guilty of no crime because she wants to inform American
political debate. Two white persons assault an African American. Both
are guilty of the basic crime of assault; one but not the other is guilty of
a hate crime because his reason for the assault was the race of his
victim.
Apart from basic liability, motive is undoubtedly relevant at
sentencing. A daughter who kills a father who is dying painfully
receives a less severe sentence than a daughter who kills a father to
inherit his assets.
In summary of this discussion, we need to be careful not to assume
that acts are the same when there are differences in states of awareness,
intentions, and motives. We also should be cautious about the extent to
which the law's taking account of these differences impinges on the rule
of law.
Let us tum now to open-ended formulas that require officials

34 See id. § 3.04(1). Under the Model Penal Code, it is apparently sufficient that the actor be
aware that the use of force is immediately necessary for self protection.
35 To illustrate, if A breaks into a house with an intent to commit a theft, he has committed a
burglary. Suppose he is arrested as he enters the house. Is his broad intent to enter and steal, or is
his motive in entering to steal? Both characterizations are accurate.
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applying the law to weigh benefits and harms. Such formulas are in
tension with an ideal that legal standards should be clear and capable of
being evenly applied, but we find them at many points in the law. Most
extensively, negligence constitutes a fundamental standard for tort
liability and plays an important part in the criminal law.36 Both
branches of law also employ recklessness, which unlike negligence
involves a conscious awareness of risk.3 7 One is negligent or reckless if
one takes an unjustified risk that causes harm. One is not negligent or
reckless if the likely good from an action justifies the risk. Thus, a
doctor whose patient dies in an operation may defend against a claim of
tort liability by claiming that every action that his surgical team
performed was justified by a calculus of risk and likely benefit. In jury
cases, jurors determine whether actors have been negligent, and
different juries may reach opposite conclusions in similar cases.
In medical cases, jurors can usually focus on the likely welfare of a
single patient, but other cases may demand a different kind of calculus.
The chief of a firefighting unit orders that homes be destroyed to
prevent the spread of a forest fire. Was it negligent to cause the certain
destruction of ten homes as a safeguard against a 40% chance that the
fire would engulf those homes and, by burning them, spread further?
Jurors must weigh a definite harm to individuals against a possible
wider good to be achieved by preventing the fire's spread. (Even if one
thinks economic analysis is the way to approach such problems,
uncertainties about facts, about valuations of various goods, and about
incentive structures can create doubt about the right outcome; and the
law provides no assurance that jurors will stick to economic analysis.)
The justification defense in criminal law requires a direct weighing
of harm and benefit. 38 What would otherwise be a criminal act is not so
if the act was necessary to avert a harm more serious than that against
which the law protects. B breaks her leg. D realizes that the injury is
not life threatening, but B is in severe pain. D drives B to the hospital
going 50 miles per hour on the streets with a speed limit of 30 miles per
hour. Was D justified? A judge (or jury) must decide.
Various constitutional standards require courts to weigh harms and
benefits, although prior cases serving as precedents tend to circumscribe
the open-endedness of various doctrinal formulas.
A search is
unconstitutional if it is unreasonable. Reasonableness depends on some
balance of the degree of intrusion on individuals against public need.
When some forms of acquiring evidence are involved, a court asks

36 The negligence relevant for criminal law involves a more extreme form of careless
behavior than ordinary negligence.
37 Historically, the courts did not systematically distinguish between recklessness and
negligence in this way. The Model Penal Code's distinction in those terms has been influential.
38 See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 3.02 (1985).
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about "reasonable expectations of privacy."39 The inquiry is not only
about what expectations people actually have but what expectations
they should have; and that depends partly on what intrusions are
necessary to serve public interests. In both equal protection and free
speech law, the compelling interest standard figures prominently. A
prison has a race riot; the warden segregates prisoners temporarily by
race.
Whether his action is constitutional depends on whether
temporary segregation is required to serve the compelling interest of
saving lives. Were the segregation to be challenged, a judge would
have to assess the degree of danger and the feasibility of alternatives
that do not involve racial classification.
When we examine the law, we run up constantly against standards
that require comparisons of harm and benefit, some applied by juries,
others by judges. Some allow a focus on risks and prospective benefits
for single individuals (the medical malpractice example); others require
judges (or jurors) to assess the harm to one individual against a broader
possible good. Standards of this sort are found in the common law, in
statutes, and in constitutional doctrine. As with legal references to
mental states, including motives, we must be cautious about
condemning open-ended standards as violations of the rule of law.
As Frederick Schauer has put it, "[M]any existing and justifiable
forms of legal decision-making are more particularistic than rulebased"40 because the law explicitly or implicitly conveys a broad
discretion or because the legal standard that is applied is so open-ended
it requires particularistic evaluation.

IV.

RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW

A.

Clearly Stated Rules

How do religious exemptions fare when we view them from the
perspective of the rule of law? We can first take relatively clear,
specific exemptions whose application is straightforward.
We should recognize, at the outset, that the reasons why people
engage in behavior (their motives) can affect how we would describe
their activities. Ingesting peyote in a worship service within a
community of believers may be quite a different experience, presenting
quite different risks, than using peyote alone simply to see extraordinary
visions. If activities are distinctively different, the law's treating them

39 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

40

Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 646
(1991).
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differently may not violate any precept or element of the rule of law.
As I have noted, we can understand privileges not to testify as
exemptions from a duty to testify. Paralleling the doctor-patient and
lawyer-client privileges is the priest-penitent privilege, which now
typically covers most confidential communications to clergy, including
what people say in counseling sessions, and which is more absolute than
the privileges of doctors and lawyers. 41 (Depending on how exactly the
privilege is formulated, the real holder of the privilege may be the cleric
himself or the person who has disclosed to the cleric and who may be
able to waive the privilege.)42
The privilege has ancient roots in the common law. Most states
now have statutory formulations, but because Congress refused to adopt
a commission's recommendations about privileges, the federal privilege
remains a matter of common law.
Whether the legal holder of the privilege is the cleric himself or the
person who has communicated to him, 43 the privilege rests on a
combination of the status of the cleric and the activity of confidential
communication. In some circumstances, whether that activity is taking
place might depend on the motives of the person who discloses
information. Suppose a minister is a former bank robber, and a friend
who is a member of her congregation asks to speak to her in private.
The friend says he is thinking of robbing a particular bank but wonders
whether that is a good idea. If his plan-say already revealed to a coconspirator-is slyly to enlist the minister in the robbery, his
communication would probably not be protected. If he is genuinely
seeking her advice about how he should behave, the conversation would
be protected.
Is the priest-penitent privilege any more at odds than the doctorpatient privilege with the rule of law principle that people who engage
in similar acts should be treated the same way?44 I see only two
arguments to this effect. The first is that the doctor-patient privilege
serves the common good, whereas the priest-penitent privilege is some
kind of concession to the power of religious institutions, or a
recognition of a transcendent sphere, or an accommodation to people's
belief in such a sphere. In fact, one can make a plausible common good

41

GREENAWALT VOL. I, supra note 18, at 246-57.
Some clerics (particularly Roman Catholic priests) may refuse to testify even if the persons
who have confessed to them have waived the privilege, and the law of evidence in some states
supports their right to refuse.
43 One might view the similar acts here as the original disclosures or the possible giving of
compelled testimony, or both; but, in any event, a confidential disclosure to a close friend does
not enjoy the protection of a disclosure to a doctor or cleric.
44 One might view the similar acts here as the original disclosures or the possible giving of
compelled testimony, or both; but in any event, a confidential disclosure to a close friend does not
enjoy the protection of a disclosure to a doctor or cleric.
42
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argument that protecting admissions of wrongdoing to clergy promotes
psychological and social health. But, as with privileges parents enjoy
toward their children, we sense that more is going on, that in part the
law treats these vital religious relationships as within a separate sphere.
I think that within a society in which religion is disestablished, the
privilege cannot rest on a judgment that true religious understanding
requires nondisclosure by clerics. But if many citizens believe these
religiously based relationships between clerics and communicants lie in
a realm that should be beyond state intrusion, its legislators or judges
may appropriately respond to that sentiment and provide a privilege,
knowing that in some rare instances its exercise will seriously
compromise fact-finding at trials. It would be a mistake to suppose that
any rule of law principle somehow bars responsiveness to the idea that
the law should make accommodations to domains of separate spheres,
such as family and religious institutions. That principle does not require
that all judgments about exemptions focus upon common good reasons
cast in utilitarian terms about temporal welfare.
A second argument that the priest-penitent privilege is, among
testimonial privileges, peculiarly at odds with the rule of law, is that it
draws an indefensible distinction between communications that receive
the privilege and those that do not. There are indisputably troublesome
borderline problems about quasi-clerics (such as nuns and church
elders) and about denominations in which all members regard
themselves as ministers, but in light of the religious understanding of
most Americans, setting apart communications to clerics is at least one
sensible, and defensible, approach.
The examination of the cleric's privilege not to testify allows us to
see that at least some exemptions cast in terms of religious relationships
do not seem a serious threat to the ideal of a rule of law.
A much more troubling and complex issue is one to which
Professor Hamilton devotes concentrated, and impassioned attentionchildren who die because their parents do not seek standard medical
treatment. Hamilton argues powerfully that these parents should face
the full gambit of criminal liability; they should not be treated better
than others who perform similar acts. More generally, she argues that
religious exemptions should not be granted when the harm to others is
more than de minimis; the harm to children who die is about as far from
de minimis as one can get.
The issues about criminal liability arise against a shared
assumption that if public officials realize that a child requires medical
care parents will not provide, they can step in to assure the treatment.
Further, they can remove the child from the parents' custody if she is,
say, a diabetic who needs continuing care the parents refuse to give her.
Parents have no right to prevent medical treatment for a needy child.
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We are, thus, focusing only on criminal sanctions for neglect and for
causing a child's death.
One of Hamilton's contentions is that exempting parents from
criminal sanctions encourages them to conceal afflicted children. No
doubt, the likelihood of concealment is one important factor in
determining what the law should provide, although I am uncertain that
instances of concealment will be fewer if the full range of the criminal
law is employed than if it is not. In any event, the main force of
Hamilton's argument lies elsewhere: allowing parents who cause their
children's deaths to "get off' is unjust and it sacrifices deterrence that
could save children's lives (because parents faced with criminal
penalties are more likely to seek standard treatments).
Hamilton's powerful appeal raises questions about what acts (or
omissions) are similar to others, about appropriate penalties, and about
deterrability.
Many parents who believe in faith healing must
experience agonizing doubt as the physical condition of their child
worsens, but they certainly do not intend the death of their children.
They are, indeed, trying hard, according to the methods of their
religious convictions, to see that the child is cured. 45 Parents who are
fully confident that spiritual methods will work are guilty only of
negligent homicide. They have not acted as a reasonable person would,
but they have neither intended that the child die nor perceived a risk that
their failure to seek ordinary treatment will cause death. Other parents
may perceive a risk that their failure to get medical treatment will cause
their child's death, but believe that the risk is slight because of their
faith in spiritual healing. None of these parents have committed
murder.46 Even ifwe stick with standard categories of criminal liability,
the faith-healing parents are radically different from those who kill
intentionally or with a blatant disregard for the value of life.
Are these parents different from other parents whose neglect of
children's illnesses result in death? Some neglectful parents are
indefensibly indifferent to the welfare of their children or they
incapacitate themselves from acting responsibly by alcohol or drug use.
The parents who believe in faith healing are, by contrast, typically doing
the best they know how to save their children. The comparison between
them and parents who are simply ignorant about the medical condition
45 This statement is not quite accurate for parents who understand that a standard form of
medical treatment may be necessary to save life, but who believe they are still barred from
accepting that treatment. This is how Jehovah's Witnesses may regard some blood transfusions,
all of which are forbidden in their view. In her response, Professor Hamilton remarks on parents
who may desire, and intend, the death of their children. What I say about states of mind does not
cover such instances, if they exist, of failures to get adequate medical treatment. Nothing I say is
addressed to the parents' state of mind about the coverage of the law.
46 I put aside a possible theory that a parent has committed the felony of child neglect that
results in death and is thus guilty of felony murder.
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of their children, or about what medical treatment can do, is more
troublesome. The ignorant parents do not understand that their failure
to act risks their children, but that is no defense to a charge of negligent
homicide. One may say they are to blame for not informing themselves
and that punishment may encourage other parents to become better
informed. At least some parents who rely on faith healing, typical
Christian Scientists come particularly to mind, are quite well informed;
they have made a deliberate decision that other methods work better
than ordinary medicine. That is some basis to treat them differently
from parents who are simply ignorant, although this is the most
disturbing asymmetry if the religious parents are exempted from
punishment and other neglectful parents are not.
When we think about just punishment, we need to recognize that
the faith-healing parents have tried to act for their child's welfare and
that they experience her death as a terrible loss. This sets them apart not
only from those who try to kill but also from those whose negligence
causes the death of strangers. We should not be surprised that
prosecutors and judges are inclined to be lenient.
The issue of deterrence is complex. Parents convinced that faith
healing will work may not be much deterred by criminal sanctions,
especially since the possible death of their child will probably seem
much more threatening to them than remoter criminal penalties after
that occurs. But for parents who are already ambivalent about what to
do, the prospect of criminal penalties may exert a push toward seeking
ordinary medical treatment. I think the main deterrence consideration is
more indirect. Highly publicized instances of Christian Scientists being
carted off to jail because their children have died may reduce the
attractiveness of Christian Science (and other similar religions) for
people who might otherwise be inclined to embrace that faith.
Where does this analysis take us? There are significant arguments
against an exemption from criminal liability for parents whose religious
rejection of ordinary medical treatment leads to the death of a child, but
there are counter arguments. If the crucial considerations come down to
effective deterrence and competing views about "just" punishment, we
should not understand a well considered decision to exempt those
parents from all or some forms of criminal liability as an offense to the
rule of law (whether or not we actually agree with that decision). And
that is true even if legislators recognize that some harm to children may
be the consequence of their decision. If, however, legislators act
thoughtlessly or in response to pressure and they categorize exemptions
in terms they cannot reasonably defend, then we may say that they have
failed to act in accord with the rule of law value that similar acts should
be treated similarly, and they have done so in a manner that fails to give
needed legal protection to innocent victims.
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Although an exemption of this sort does not favor the powerful of
society in any straightforward sense, Hamilton suggests a more subtle
argument about unwarranted privilege. Americans generally view
religion as benign. This attitude opens the way for affected religious
groups, small as they may be, to succeed in the political process,
compromising the vital interests of innocent, defenseless, unrepresented
children. In this manner, we can see that a dominant attitude towards
religion results in a privilege to do harm that is at odds with the
common good. Insofar as this critique succeeds, it intensifies concern
about a sacrifice in rule of law values.
B.

Vague Standards with Uncertain Applications

A major aspect of Professor Hamilton's complaint about religious
exemptions concerns vague standards whose application is uncertain.
These are found in federal and state statutes, as well as in judicially
developed doctrines implementing free exercise guarantees. Is any such
standard a serious breach of the rule of law? Do the particular standards
courts and legislators have formulated raise especially serious rule of
law problems?
I assume here, with Hamilton, that some exemptions cast in terms
of religion are appropriate. On at least certain occasions people with
religious reasons to perform specific acts, such as ingesting peyote in
worship services, may properly be treated differently from most people
who would like to perform those acts. Further, not every exemption
need be cast in terms of persons with moral, conscientious, or
associative reasons to perform acts (broader categories into which
persons with religious reasons would fall); sometimes exemptions are
sensibly limited to these with religious reasons. I also assume that,
despite Hamilton's treatment of the decline of institutional and status
privileges as an evolution toward fairness and equality,47 that an
exemption might properly be offered that includes more than individual
belief and practice and that directly benefits corporate religious groups
and their officers. The clerical privilege not to testify is an example of
status being crucial; exemptions for peyote use go to those who
participate within religious groups.48
Hamilton's fundamental approach to religious exemptions is that
they are properly granted if those performing an act for religious
47
48

HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 238-72.
The special constitutional limits of judicial scrutiny of religious doctrines in property
disputes might also be viewed as favoring religious organizations, and this is especially so if a
state decides to defer to the highest adjudicatory bodies of hierarchical churches. See
GREENAWALT VOL. I, supra note 18, at 270-77.
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reasons do no harm that is more than de minimis. 49 She strongly urges
that legislators, not judges (and presumably not jurors), must make the
determination whether a particular proposed exemption would or would
not do harm, and whether it is or is not consonant with the common
good. 50 We need to ask whether performance of this task by judges
rather than legislators necessarily violates the rule of law, and whether
individual assessments violate the rule of law if the standard of decision
favors religious claims more than Hamilton proposes.
When judges are left to apply vague standards like those in the
federal and state statutes, the rule of law ideal of judges evenly applying
a clear law that is declared in advance cannot be satisfied. If a
legislature grants a specific exemption, it produces a written law that
can be applied consistently; that becomes impossible if judges must
engage in the complex, difficult weighing of considerations. But we
have seen that many parts of our law require judges or jurors to
undertake just such endeavors. If we do not perceive these as violating
the rule of law in a troubling way, we may doubt that using such an
approach for religious exemptions necessarily does so.
I see no compelling reason to suppose that the subject of religious
exemptions necessarily falls into the lap of legislators. The law of
evidence was developed historically by courts; deciding whether to
recognize a clerical privilege not to testify was then properly in the
judicial domain. And a state constitution might explicitly provide that
its free exercise clause, to be applied by courts, involves a right to
engage in otherwise illegal acts that do not harm anyone.
A plausible objection to judicial resolution under vague standards
has to rest on a claim that the particular standards for decision are ones
courts are incompetent to apply and, relatedly, are highly uncertain in
application; or are ones that inevitably will yield unjustified resolutions
in favor of exemptions that involve religiously grounded acts.
The formulas to which Hamilton objects provide for relief from
legal requirements that impose substantial burdens on religious exercise
unless applying the requirements to religious claimants is needed to
serve a compelling interest that cannot be achieved by less restrictive
means. Were the compelling interest approach to demand of the
government as much as is demanded of it in instances of racial
discrimination, religious claimants would win a great deal of the time.
Results would then be fairly predictable, but at the cost of privileging
much behavior that should not be privileged. Were a different standard
used, one that tracked Hamilton's sense of when legislators should
confer exemptions, results might also be fairly predictable, and the task
of judges not too onerous. The standard that the statutes contain lies
49 HAMILTON, supra note I, at 280.
50 Id. at 275, 297; see also Professor Hamilton's Response in this issue.
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between these points on a spectrum. RFRA explicitly indicates that it is
meant to follow the constitutional standard the Supreme Court
employed from 1963 (when Sherbert v. Verner was decided) up to 1990
(when Employment Division v. Smith eliminated a constitutionally based
exemption for most circumstances). After Sherbert v. Verner, most
courts, including the Supreme Court, rejected most claims for
exemption. 51 Although courts used the language of the compelling
interest test, they sustained applications of general laws against
religious claimants on bases that would not have been strong enough to
support racial discrimination or laws aimed at curbing expression. So,
what we had under Sherbert v. Verner and have under the more recent
statutes was and is an intermediate standard under which religious
claims win and lose with some frequency. This undeniably enhances
the degree of uncertainty and produces unevenness of results. 52 But we
could say the same thing about the basic standard of negligence in torts
or the general justification defense in criminal law.
Hamilton offers the further challenge that judges are incompetent
to apply the standard they have been given. 53 The basic reason is that
judges must weigh the burden on religion against the common good
served by a restrictive law's application, but the circumstances of
individual cases do not provide adequate factual information to assess
issues of the common good. For example, judges may be unaware just
how many disciplinary and administrative problems may be caused by a
concession to a prisoner's claim to deviate from ordinary prison rules. 54
Hamilton has undoubtedly raised a serious problem. When the common
good involves factors not obvious from the claim of the religious
person, perhaps the government is not likely to produce the relevant
information (based on testimony or the kind of background sources on
which appellate courts feel free to rely). However, it seems likely that
courts can be adequately responsive to the common good if they afford
reasonable deference to administrative judgments, an approach
supported for prison cases by the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Cutter v. Wilkinson. 55 Indeed, if judges simply accept virtually any
assertion prison officials make about the requisites of discipline,
underestimations of the common good reasons to deny privileges will
be few.
I am not sure how much of Hamilton's case about judicial
incompetence rests on an example she has chosen, but her analysis of
that example drifts so far from my own assessment, it gives me pause
51 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
52 For a summary of a range of cases, see GREENAWALT VOL. I,
53 HAMILTON, supra note l, at 297.
54 Id. at 153, 156.
55 544 U.S. 709 (2005).

supra note 18, at 201-32.
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about the strength of her overall thesis. Orthodox Jewish students
playing sports wanted to wear yarmulkes held by bobby pins, in
violation of the rule of a high school association against players wearing
headgear, which was based on a concern that if headgear fell off that
could endanger other players. 56 Writing during the period when
Sherbert v. Verner represented the constitutional rule, Judge Richard
Posner for the Seventh Circuit expressed some doubt that the Talmud
required that yarmulkes be worn by those engaging in sports and also
suggested that a chin strap might hold a yarmulke without any safety
risk.
The court held that the Jewish athletes did not have a
constitutional right to wear yarmulkes insecurely fastened by bobby
pins, but it remanded to the district court to see if the plaintiffs could
find a way to secure the head covering in a manner that would meet the
safety concerns. Among Hamilton's remarks about the case are these:
"the court was basing its decision on an individual assessment of Jewish
law"; 57 the court took on "the full power of the legislative or regulating
powers-assessing the need for accommodation, the means of
accommodation, and even the financial cost";ss this "was judicial law
making at its most arrogant. "59
My sense of the case is quite different. Given the exact dispute
before it, the court upheld the association's application of its safety rule.
It reached no final determination about Jewish law or about feasible
alternatives.
The plaintiffs on remand were left to decide for
themselves what they thought Jewish law allowed and to come up with
a safe alternative, if they could. Here there was nothing elusive about
the common good. The safety danger was easily explicable and
comprehensible. In short, the assessment of the religious claim against
the state's interest in safety seemed comfortably within judicial
capacity; and Judge Posner's willingness to go beyond the exact
parameters of the original conflict has seemed to me a wholly
appropriate way to promote a resolution satisfactory to both sides, if one
were possible.
No doubt, other cases do present more difficult questions about
common good; but if the issue is judicial competence, as compared with
legislative competence and legislative willingness to address peculiar,
narrow problems, we need to look carefully at the range of issues courts
face when they apply statutes like RFRA and RLUIP A.
In summary, we have seen that one element in the concept of the
rule of law may be less fully achieved than it could be, when

56 Menora v. Ill. High Sch. Ass'n, 683 F.2d, 1030, 1031 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1156 (1983).
57 HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 124.
58 Id. at 125.
59 Id. at 126.
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exemptions from ordinary legal requirements are granted to those with
religious reasons to perform otherwise illegal acts; and that another
element in the concept of the rule of law is unfulfilled when exemptions
are cast in general and vague terms, to be applied on a case by case
basis. But both specific and general exemptions resemble other aspects
of our legal system that are uncontroversial and are not thought to
detract from the ability of our society to live by the rule of law in some
general sense. 60 If we take "the rule of law" as an either-or concept, it
plainly does not demand that all aspects of the legal system fit the
pattern of clear legal rules applied evenly. Whether the present set of
religious exemptions gives undue advantage to religious persons and
groups and imposes tasks on courts for which they are ill suited raises
important and difficult social questions. These questions do tie into
questions about the proper place of various rule of law elements, but we
can reach no simple judgments about what the rule of law requires in
respect to religious exemptions.

60 See Schauer, supra note 40.

